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This commentary consists of three parts. The first attempts to summarize the main theme of
Weinstein’s paper, insofar as I can understand it; the latter qualification is obvious and almost
redundant, except that I must confess I found it very challenging to make sense of his essay. The
second part of my commentary advances some negative criticism of his paper, by focusing on
issues of conceptual clarity and argumentative cogency. The third part elaborates a positive
appreciation of what seems to be Weinstein’s main claim; I do so mostly on the basis of things
which he does not even mention, but with which I happen to be acquainted.
1. Interpretation
A big part of Weinstein’s paper (Section 3, pp. 3-6) offers an account of the history and
methodology of physical chemistry (primarily atomic theory) in terms of three epistemological
notions, which he labels consilience, breadth, and depth. He defines these three concepts as
follows: “consilience, requires that theories are increasingly supported by a body of evidence that
is improving in scope and detail. Breadth requires that a theory explains an increasing number of
diverse phenomena, and depth requires that a theory is reinterpreted in terms of higher-order
explanatory frameworks that connect it to other theories of increasing breadth and increasing
evidentiary adequacy” (p. 6).
An even bigger part of Weinstein’s paper (Sections 4-5, pp. 6-10) presents a similar account
of the recent history of cognitive science that includes not only theories of cognition, but also
theories of emotions, as well as theories of the neuro-physiology of the brain. In his own words:
As the models, indicated below, show, the brain coordinates functions across an array of inputs
permitting an integrated response that enables perception, memory and purposes to bring
together information necessary for coordinated action in the world. I see this as a clear parallel
with consilience, the increasing systematic effectiveness across areas [of] concern as the
sciences develop and new problems are confronted. Second, the brain integrates the broad array
of disparate information, proprioceptive, hormonal, electrical, and chemical, integrating new
input with stored input and modifying content in relation to newly acquired stimuli of many
kinds. This seems to me parallel to breadth. Most importantly, all of these functions are
accounted for on increasingly defined more abstract levels, moving from gross physiological
function to the operation at the cellular level, and if we accept materialism, to the molecular
level, as we understand the functions of the neurological array [based] on the deepest
physiological levels. This has a clear parallel with depth, the reinterpretation of a theory in
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terms of a higher order, more abstract and more deeply ontological sense of the ultimate
real[i]ties behind the phenomena. (P. 9, brackets mine)
The paper ends (Section 7, “Conclusion,” pp. 10-11) with what looks like a plea that informal
logic and argumentation theory model themselves on physical chemistry and cognitive science, by
taking seriously the epistemological ideals of consilience, breadth, and depth. Here, Weinstein
advances several suggestions, the most striking of which is this: that the analysis of “argument
must move from structure to the functions the structures exemplify, and in particular, the function
of warrants that reflect the underlying networks of commitments in directing and sustaining
argument. This requires more than a complication of argument diagramming, but rather a
movement into the detail of support: how commitments to warrants and the networks of beliefs
that they represent alter the evaluation of evidence, both evidence sought and evidence already
available” (pp. 10-11). This suggestion is striking because it also corresponds to the main message
which Weinstein seems to want to convey in his paper’s title, abstract, and introduction. Indeed,
in the preliminary section (no. 2, “Setting the problem,” pp. 1-3) Weinstein confesses that this
paper is his latest attempt to elaborate and justify a thesis he has advocated for a long time: “My
suggestion over many years and many papers is that the analysis and evaluation of arguments
requires a focus on warrants. But the adequacy of warrants, whether construed as generalizations
or inference tickets, shifts the focus from evidence to the commitments through which evidence is
selected, organized and applied. Concern with warrants moves the analysis of argument into a
subject-matter dependent stance” (p. 3; cf. Weinstein, 1990a, 1990b, 2003, 2011, 2013).
2. Criticism
One difficulty I have with this pertains to the clarity of the three concepts of consilience, breadth,
and depth; it leaves much to be desired, to say the least.
For example, we are told that consilience refers to the increasing scope of the supporting
evidence, and that breadth refers to the increasing number of diverse phenomena explained; but
these two things sound the same to me. Similarly, consilience also involves increasing details in
the supporting evidence, which seems to be what depth is all about. Thus, I don’t see that
consilience is a distinct concept, above and beyond breadth and depth; as defined by Weinstein,
consilience seems to repeat what breadth and depth require. Part of the confusion may stem from
the fact that consilience as ordinarily understood is a relationship between two or more theories,
whereas Weinstein seems to treat it as a (monadic) property of a theory.
Accordingly, Weinstein’s application of these concepts to physical chemistry and to cognitive
science is correspondingly confusing, if not confused. For example, at one point in the history of
physical chemistry it was discovered that protons and the atomic numbers of elements were to be
supplemented with neutrons and atomic weights. To me, it’s not at all clear whether the resulting
more adequate theory possessed greater breadth, or greater depth, or greater consilience, or all
three, or none of the three. With regard to cognitive science, I think I understand that, if and to the
extent that emotions can be explained in terms of cognition, then the breadth of cognitive science
is enhanced; on the other hand, if and to the extent that cognitive states and phenomena can be
explained on the basis of neuro-physiological processes, then the breadth of neuro-physiological
theory is enhanced. However, I don’t see that any of this yields an enhancement of the depth or
consilience of any one of these theories.
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Independently of this difficulty, there is another one, which seems to me even more serious.
That is, Weinstein’s methodological and epistemological analysis of physical chemistry and of
cognitive science says (almost) nothing about the reasoning and arguments advanced or used by
physical chemists or cognitive scientists. Thus, I don’t see that from such an analysis anything
follows about how informal logicians and argumentation theorists ought to conduct and practice
their business, namely the interpretation, evaluation, and analysis of arguments. In other words,
insofar as Weinstein’s effort in this paper (as summarized above) is itself an argument, it is an
obvious instance of non-sequitur. On the other hand, perhaps this paper is not advancing an
argument; in that case, it would be a non-argument about non-arguments. In either case, the
relevance of the paper would be the issue.
3. Appreciation
Despite the destructive criticism just considered, I believe there is something right and important
in the main claim asserted by Weinstein in this paper’s title, abstract, introduction, and conclusion.
At least, this is so if I understand it right. Again, as formulated in the introduction, the claim is that
the analysis of argumentation should “focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and … [more
on] the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary moves” (p. 1).
Here, as a preliminary, let me say that I applaud the way in which Weinstein starts his
substantive discussion. He does so by referring to some current articles by columnists in the New
York Times. One of his examples is a recent column by Paul Krugman (2020) that discusses the
politicians running to be nominated by the Democratic Party as this party’s candidate in the 2020
election for President of the United States. At one point, Krugman raises the issue of the cause of
the Great Recession of 2008, in order to criticize some of the candidates and defend others. His
own view is that the cause was “the erosion of effective financial regulation over the previous few
decades” (Krugman, 2020, p. 22). He dismisses alternative accounts as “zombie ideas—ideas that
should have been killed by evidence, but just keep lurching along.” One of these is the “narrative
in which liberals somehow caused the crisis by forcing poor innocent bankers to lend money” to
people who could not repay it. On this, Weinstein comments that “clearly, both of these claims
may be considered reasonably appropriate evidence supporting claims about the cause of the
financial crisis, and equally clearly the evidence does not in any way resolve the dispute as to
which point of view is a ‘zombie’” (p. 2).
In other words, Weinstein is attributing to Krugman a denial of his own thesis about
“warranting evidence in diverse evidentiary settings” (p. 1). Now, with all due respect to Krugman
(who is an M.I.T. graduate, a Princeton emeritus professor, and the 2008 Nobel Prize laureate in
economics), I believe Weinstein’s attribution is essentially accurate. In fact, Krugman’s columns
frequently display such an approach (Krugman 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016). I also agree with
Weinstein that such a practice is very damaging and undesirable for anyone engaged in
argumentation.
Weinstein also deserves credit for calling attention to a recent New York Times column by a
mathematician entitled “Mismeasuring the coronavirus,” which explains how “up-to-the-minute
reports and statistics can unintentionally distort the facts” (Paulos, 2020). Although such a problem
will be familiar to an applied logician or philosopher of science, in light of the ongoing pandemic
it is extremely useful to discuss the problem in terms of the current situation. And I also agree with
Weinstein that this article (unlike Krugman’s) seems to illustrate and confirm Weinstein’s own
main thesis.
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Let us now go on to an area which I want to exploit by using its material to illustrate and justify
Weinstein’s main claim, at least partially, and at least in my own way. The topic is the Copernican
Revolution, understood as the transition from a geostatic and geocentric worldview to a
heliocentric and geokinetic worldview; this transition started roughly in 1543 with the publication
of Nicolaus Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres and ended roughly in 1687
with the publication of Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. What
makes this development especially relevant in the present context is the fact that for about a century
and one-half there was a controversy consisting of all kinds of arguments for and against the
motion of the earth; indeed such pro- and anti-Copernican arguments probably constitute the
richest collection of argumentation in the history of thought. In this regard, the contributions and
works of Galileo Galilei are especially relevant and instructive because he was very much aware
of such a logical aspect of the Copernican controversy and was able to make epoch-making
contributions to its resolution (cf. Finocchiaro 1980, 1997, 2010, 2014, 2019).
In his 1543 book, Copernicus had shown that the known facts about the motion of the heavenly
bodies could be explained in quantitative detail if one assumes that the earth rotates daily on its
own axis and revolves yearly in an orbit around the sun. Such an explanation was not only a novel
alternative to the geostatic explanation, but also simpler, more coherent, and less ad hoc. However,
although better, the Copernican theory was not conclusively proved, because of the explanatory
form of its supporting argument, and also because of the existence of many apparently
unanswerable counter-arguments. Let’s examine some of these.
Some of the objections were epistemological, the most famous being the argument from the
deception of the senses. That is, direct sense-experience reveals that the earth stands still; for
example, we do not feel any terrestrial motion; and we see heavenly bodies move around the earth.
Thus, if the earth were in motion, our senses would be deceiving us—would not be telling us the
truth. But this is absurd, since the human senses are the main instruments we have to learn about
reality.
Some of the anti-Copernican arguments were religious or theological. The most common of
these was the scriptural argument. That is, it is stated or implied in many passages of the Bible that
the earth stands still at the center of the universe; for example, in Joshua 10:12-13, God does the
miracle of stopping the sun from setting, so that daylight would last longer, in answer to Joshua’s
prayer that the Israelites were engaged in a battle with the Amorites, and their advantage would be
lost if the sun set and night came. Now, the Bible cannot err, and so the earth does not move.
However, another group of arguments were mechanical, in the sense of being based on the
motion of bodies near the surface of the earth. One was the vertical fall argument. That is, it can
be easily observed that freely falling bodies move vertically; for example, this is what happens to
rain when there is no wind; and if one drops a rock from a window, the rock lands at the foot of
the building. Now, such vertical fall could not happen on a rotating earth, because the freely falling
body would be left behind while the ground and the building would be carried eastward by the
earth’s rotation, and so the body would land to the west of where it was dropped, after following
a slanted path. Therefore, the earth does not rotate.
Another mechanical argument was based on the range of gunshots toward the east and toward
the west. Again, observation and experience reveal that eastward gunshots reach a distance equal
to that of westward gunshots. This could not happen if the earth were rotating, because on a rotating
earth the distance traveled by eastward gunshots would be the difference between their own
projectile motion and the eastward motion of the gun carried by the earth, whereas the distance
traveled by westward gunshots would be the sum of their own projectile motion and the same
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eastward motion of the gun carried by the rotating earth. The conclusion is, again, that the earth
cannot rotate.
A third mechanical argument was based on the extruding power of whirling, as at that time
they called what today we would call centrifugal force. That is, if the earth were rotating, then
bodies on its surface should fly off toward the heavens, because such bodies would find themselves
in a whirling system, which for example at the equator would be undergoing a speed of about 1,000
miles per hour, and we know that such whirling generates an extruding power away from the center
of rotation. However, such extrusion is not observed, but rather even a feather (when there is no
wind) can lie on the ground motionless and undisturbed. It follows that the earth cannot be
undergoing rotational motion.
The resolution of the Copernican controversy required not only the invention and construction
of new arguments supporting the earth’s motion, but also the refutation of the arguments against
it. If we look at Galileo’s criticism of the mechanical arguments against the earth’s motion, we
can, I believe, get closer to the topic anticipated above. Here, there will be time and space only for
the vertical-fall argument, although similar considerations would apply to the east-west gunshot
argument and to the extrusion argument. Galileo’s critique of the vertical-fall argument is the
following.
It is not true that on a rotating earth freely falling bodies would be left behind during their fall.
The reason is that if the earth were rotating, before a given body started falling freely, it would be
carried by the earth’s rotation; for example, if I am dropping a rock from a window, while the rock
is still in my hand, it would be carried along toward the east, together with my hand, my body, and
the building. As an approximation, considering a small part of the earth’s surface, we can say that
on a rotating earth, before the body started to fall down, it would possess an horizontal motion
toward the east. Now, this horizontal eastward motion would not be lost but would be retained
after the body started falling. The reason for this is that motion, once acquired, is conserved, unless
it is subject to disturbance or interferences; this claim may be called the principle of the
conservation of motion, which corresponds to the law of the conservation of momentum and the
law of inertia of modern physics. Because of conservation of motion, on a rotating earth the falling
body, besides falling, would also be moving eastward, so as to land at the foot of the building, with
an apparent vertical trajectory. Nor would it be correct say, as the anti-Copernicans would be
inclined to say, that on a rotating earth, the falling body’s horizontal motion would not be
conserved because its vertically downwards motion would interfere with it; here the antiCopernican would be running counter to the principle of the composition of motion, which
stipulates if and how motions in different directions are combined.
In short, in his criticism of the vertical-fall argument against the earth’s motion, Galileo was
appealing to the principles of conservation and of composition of motion. In so doing he was
pointing out that this anti-Copernican argument presupposed such principles as the following: that
motion (even uniform motion) requires a force in order to continue, otherwise it spontaneously
dissipates; and that bodies can have one and only natural motion (so that on a rotating earth a
falling body could not simultaneously move eastward and downward). Now, it turned out that the
principles of conservation and of composition became an integral part of modern physics, and that
the just-mentioned anti-Copernican principles were part of the Aristotelian physics which had to
be rejected. However, in the historical context, besides providing the analysis elaborated above,
Galileo could not simply assert the principles of conservation and of composition; he had to argue
and provide evidence in their support, and he did do that (cf. Finocchiaro, 2014, pp. 105-112).
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Nevertheless, in the Galilean analysis elaborated above, it does seem that, to use Weinstein’s
terminology and framework, there is a “focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and … [more
on] the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary moves” (p. 1).
That is, the anti-Copernican alleged evidence was vertical fall. Galileo did not focus on whether
bodies really fall vertically, or whether they deviate in some manner. Instead, he focused on the
network of warrants that made vertical fall so crucial, namely the principles of Aristotelian physics,
which the anti-Copernican argument presupposed. And Galileo also focused on the network of
warrants which made up his own new science of motion, and which were to replace the old physics.
In this sense, I feel I have illustrated and justified Weinstein’s main claim.
Finally, a qualification is in order. I don’t think that we should exaggerate the correctness or
applicability of Weinstein’s thesis. In fact, I don’t think it would be of much help in the analysis
of another group of anti-Copernican arguments. These were the astronomical observational
arguments. The argument from the earth-heaven dichotomy claimed that the earth cannot revolve
around the sun because, if it did, it would be a heavenly body, and so the physical properties of
terrestrial and heavenly bodies would be essentially identical; but they are not. The argument from
Venus’s phases claimed that the earth could not move around the sun because, if it did, the relative
positions of sun, Venus, and the earth would change in such a way that Venus would exhibit phases
in the course of a year; but no phases of Venus were observable. The argument from the appearance
of Mars claimed that the earth cannot be the third planet orbiting the sun because, if it were, then
the distance between it and the fourth planet Mars would change by a factor of about eight as they
both revolved around the sun at different rates; thus, as seen from the earth, Mars should exhibit
corresponding changes in apparent brightness and size; but these were not observed. And the
argument from the apparent position of fixed stars claimed that the earth cannot revolve around
the sun because, if it did, then in the course of a year (for example, at six-month intervals) terrestrial
observers would be looking at any one fixed star from a very different location, and so its apparent
position should exhibit an annual variation; but no such variation was observed, and thus the earth
could not be in motion.
Galileo’s criticism of these arguments was that, with the telescope, one could observe the
phenomena that resulted from the earth’s heliocentric revolution: physical similarities between
terrestrial and heavenly bodies, phases of Venus, and significant variations in the apparent size of
Mars. For these arguments, he did not have to examine their warrants and presuppositions; he
simply refuted their respective minor premises, which is what telescopic observation enabled him
to do. To be sure, for the argument from the apparent position of fixed stars, even his telescope did
not reveal any annual variation; and this situation actually forced him to examine the warrants and
presuppositions of this arguments. However, the elaboration of such qualifications is beyond the
scope of the present commentary (but cf. Finocchiaro, 2014, pp. 167-209; 2019, pp. 77-92, 13744).

References
Finocchiaro, M.A. (1980). Galileo and the art of reasoning: Rhetorical foundations of logic and
scientific method. (Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 61.) Dordrecht: Reidel.
Finocchiaro, M.A. (Ed. and Trans.). (1997). Galileo on the world systems: A new abridged
6

translation and guide. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Finocchiaro, M.A. (2010). Defending Copernicus and Galileo: Critical reasoning in the two
affairs. (Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 280). Dordrecht: Springer.
Finocchiaro, M.A. (2014). The Routledge guidebook to Galileo’s Dialogue. London: Routledge.
Finocchiaro, M.A. (2019). On trial for reason: Science, religion, and culture in the Galileo affair.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Krugman, P. (2012). The blackmail caucus. New York Times, November 2, p. A27; cf.
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/opinion/krugman-the-blackmailcaucus.html?searchResultPosition=2
Krugman, P. (2014). Crazy climate economics: How environmentalism became a Marxist plot.
New York Times, May 12, p. A23; cf.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/opinion/krugman-crazy-climateeconomics.html?searchResultPosition=1
Krugman, P. (2015). Europe’s impossible dream: How fantasy economics led to disaster. New
York Times, July 20, p. A19. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/opinion/paul-krugmaneuropes-impossible-dream.html?searchResultPosition=1
Krugman, P. (2016). Truth and Trumpism: Don’t believe the peddlers of centrification or fall for
false comparisons. New York Times, May 6, p. A25; cf.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/opinion/truth-and
trumpism.html?searchResultPosition=1
Krugman, P. (2020). Have zombies eaten Bloomberg’s and Buttigieg’s brains? Beware the
Democrats of the living dead. New York Times, February 18, p. A22.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/opinion/bloomberg-buttigiegeconomy.html?searchResultPosition=1
Paulos, J.A. (2020). Mismeasuring the coronavirus. New York Times, February 19, p. A23; cf.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/opinion/coronavirus-china-numbers.html
Weinstein, M. (1990a). Towards an account of argumentation in science. Argumentation, 4, 269298.
Weinstein, M. (1990b). Towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking.
Informal Logic, 12, 121-143.
Weinstein, M. (2003). If at first you don’t succeed: Response to Johnson. In F. H. van Eemeren,
C. A. Willard, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the 5th ISSA Conference of
Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat, International Centre for the Study of Argumentation.
Weinstein, M. (2011). Arguing towards truth: The case of the periodic table. Argumentation, 25,
185-197.
Weinstein, M. (2013). Logic, truth and inquiry. London: College Publications.

7

